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Abstract
This paper considers the involvement of fathers in decisions about adoption, particu-
larly in circumstances where a mother resists such involvement. It is largely a response 
to the work of Jill Marshall, who has argued strongly in favour of anonymous birth and 
adoption for children (without involvement of their fathers) as a choice that can be 
validly exercised by mothers. The paper argues that Marshall’s views are not obviously 
consistent with the requirements of Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of  the Child, requiring states to ‘respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
 parents  … to provide … appropriate direction and guidance’ in the child’s exercise 
of her rights.
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1 Introduction
Adoption has profound consequences for the child concerned, since it will 
 often1 produce a severance of the legal relationship between parent and child, 
1 Cf. ‘simple adoption’, a form of adoption available in France and some other civil law jurisdic-
tions, which ‘does not sever the relationship with the family of origin so that the adopted 
child is not entirely integrated into his or her adoptive family’: (Council of Europe (2008: 
[63]).
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and the creation of new legal relationships between the child and a new set of 
parents. This paper considers the involvement of fathers2 in decisions about 
adoption, particularly in circumstances where a mother resists such involve-
ment. The paper is largely a response to the work of Jill Marshall (2012; 2018), 
who has forcefully argued in favour of anonymous birth and adoption for chil-
dren (without involvement of their fathers) as a choice that can be validly ex-
ercised by mothers. The argument of this paper is that Marshall’s views are not 
obviously consistent with the requirements of Article 5 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (crc), requiring states to ‘respect the responsibili-
ties, rights and duties of parents … to provide … appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention’, and other provisions of the crc such as Articles 7 and 8.
The paper begins by engaging in a detailed policy discussion on issues sur-
rounding the involvement of fathers in the adoption process with reference to 
Article 5 and other crc provisions, including whether Article 5 has much to 
say about adoption at all. With reference to the policy conclusions drawn, it 
goes on to consider the substantive treatment of the issue in the law of Eng-
land and Wales, Scotland and Ireland respectively.3
2 The crc, Fathers and Adoption: policy Issues
2.1 The Core Scenario
The typical scenario considered in this paper is where a child is born, perhaps 
following a fleeting or essentially non-existent relationship (involving sexual 
intercourse only) between the biological parents, to a mother who wants the 
child to be adopted by strangers swiftly and without the involvement, or per-
haps even the knowledge, of the father. Depending on the facts or the legal 
system in question, the mother may also have succeeded in, purported to or 
2 Similar issues could apply to other legal parents who have not given birth to the child. That 
said, in the United Kingdom, for example, it seems unlikely (albeit not impossible) that a 
second female parent who has complied with the agreed female parenthood conditions (Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s. 44) could end up without parental responsibil-
ity, and it will be seen that such responsibility is key to involvement in the adoption 
process.
3 The law in Northern Ireland largely mirrors that in England and Wales on the allocation of 
parental responsibility (Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995), but on adoption it is some-
what modelled on the older law in the English Adoption Act 1976, which did not treat child 
welfare as the paramount consideration and did not apply a straightforward welfare test to 
dispensing with consent (Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987). This could have varying 
consequences for both crc compatibility and involvement of fathers in adoption.
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wished to give birth “anonymously” “in secret”, such that no link is even re-
corded between the child and the mother, let alone between the child and the 
father. The implications of the crc for such a scenario, irrespective of the par-
ticular national legal system involved, must now be considered.
2.2 Fathers and the Relevance of Article 5 or Other crc Provisions
Article 5 of the crc requires states to:
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where appli-
cable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for 
by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for 
the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities 
of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the 
child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
The first question to be addressed is whether this particular article has any 
relevance to the involvement of fathers in the adoption process.
It could be argued that Article 5 has little explicitly to say about adoption. At 
the very least, it is significantly less relevant to the issue than other provisions 
of the Convention, particularly Article 21 with its express reference to adop-
tion. I suggest, however, that a key phrase in Article 5 for present purposes is ‘in 
the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention’. 
Whatever the inherent difficulties in apparently recognising parental rights in 
a children’s rights convention, then (see, e.g., McGoldrick, 1991), Article 5 really 
has any impact only when read alongside the rest of the Convention. Much of 
the Convention self-evidently does address adoption. Most obviously, Article 
21 requires states that recognise the concept of adoption to ensure that ‘best 
interests of the child’ ‘shall be the paramount consideration’, but also requires 
that the adoption is ‘permissible in view of the child’s status concerning par-
ents, relatives and legal guardians’ and refers to the ‘informed consent to the 
adoption’ of relevant persons.
Other potentially relevant crc obligations include protecting a child’s right, 
‘as far as possible, … to know and be cared for by … her parents’ (Article 7), re-
specting a child’s right to her identity and ‘family relations’ (Article 8), ensur-
ing that ‘a child shall not be separated from … her parents against their will, 
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is neces-
sary for the best interests of the child’ (Article 9), treating a child’s best inter-
ests as a primary consideration and ensuring ‘such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being’, but ‘taking into account the rights and 
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 duties of his or her parents’ (Article 3), and rendering ‘appropriate assistance 
to parents and legal guardians’, who ‘have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of the child’, ‘in the performance of their child-
rearing responsibilities’ (Article 18). All of these are in principle rights of the 
child. Thus, while the phrasing may sometimes be awkward, and these articles 
may well have more force in the adoption context if considered on a stand-
alone basis, by being involved in the adoption process a father is arguably pro-
viding ‘direction and guidance’ to the child (or in practice her representatives 
where she is too young to form a view) in ensuring that (for example) her rights 
to have her welfare treated as the paramount consideration (particularly given 
the uncertainty attached to that concept: Sloan, 2013), to know and be cared 
for by her parents, or to establish her identity, are respected. While much of the 
focus of the literature on Article 5 is inevitably on ‘evolving capacities’ (as evi-
denced by many of the contributions to this special issue), it would surely go 
too far to suggest that a child has no Article 5 rights where she has yet truly to 
develop any relevant capacities. Significantly, moreover, it is in its chapter on 
Article 5 that Unicef ’s Implementation Handbook (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007: 
75) notes that ‘[i]n no sense is the Convention “anti-family”, nor does it pit chil-
dren against their parents’, that ‘the Preamble upholds the family as “the fun-
damental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and 
well-being of all its members and particularly children”’, and that ‘[s]everal ar-
ticles emphasize the primary responsibility of parents and place strict limits 
on state intervention and any separation of children from their parents’. De-
spite the initial impression, then, I suggest that read in its context Article 5 is 
highly relevant to the situation considered in this paper, even if it remains less 
relevant than other articles.
2.3 Mothers and Article 5 etc.
Of course, on particular facts, a swift adoption could secure the Convention 
rights of the child, whether facilitating the paramountcy (Article 21) or prima-
cy (Article 3) of her best interests, protecting the child from ‘all forms of physi-
cal or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, mal-
treatment or exploitation’ while in the care of parents, legal guardians or others 
(Article 19), providing ‘special protection and assistance’ and alternative care 
where she cannot remain in her home environment (Article 20), protecting the 
child’s ‘inherent right to life’ and ensuring ‘to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child’ (Article 6), granting her ‘the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health’ (Article 24), ‘a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social develop-
ment’ (Article 27), education (Article 28) and special protection if he or she is 
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disabled (Article 23). It could be argued that, in at least some circumstances, a 
mother could invoke Article 5 to say that she is providing ‘appropriate direction 
and guidance’ in relation to the exercise of these rights by the child by advocat-
ing a swift adoption without the involvement of the father (or potentially oth-
er, wider, family members). Conversely, she could argue that any ‘direction and 
guidance’ provided by the father if involved would not be ‘appropriate’.
As is inevitable much of the time with the Convention (Alston, 1994), then, 
the question is how to resolve a conflict of norms, or potentially a conflict of 
the same norm invoked from different perspectives leading to conflicting 
conclusions.
2.4 Marshall on the crc and Identity
It is now necessary to summarise the views of Marshall on the core scenario 
addressed in this chapter, critiquing them with reference to the interpretations 
of the crc put forward in the previous sub-sections. For Marshall, any conflict 
between legal norms relating to the core scenario in this paper, which on my 
analysis would include differing interpretations of Article 5, should apparently 
always be resolved in favour of the mother’s wishes, leading to a situation 
where a father and child may not even be aware of, let alone meet or live with, 
each other.
In an important initial qualification to her work, however, Marshall (2018: 
168) advocates ‘a conceptual separation between the one who gives birth and 
the mother’. Similarly, in her view (2018: 171, n. 25), ‘the man who contributes 
sperm to create the child is not a father by this act alone’, such that she ‘would 
like’, albeit does not use, ‘a different word to denote the distinction between 
this and genuine fatherhood’. Significantly, Marshall elsewhere (2012) uses 
quotation marks around the word “father” to reflect her preference. This in it-
self is potentially problematic for the purposes of Articles 7 and 8.
Much of her view on the nature of motherhood and fatherhood and other 
points is coloured by the fact (Marshall, 2018: 176) that there is ‘no explicit ref-
erence in these provisions [of the crc, among others] … to the biological fam-
ily and, although the family in which the child is raised will commonly be the 
genetic/biological family, this will not always be so, including in secret birth 
situations’. On Marshall’s (2018: 177) analysis, Articles 7 and 8 ‘were … drafted to 
deal with situations of forced removals, quite unlike voluntary secret births 
and so to which different considerations should apply’.
She expresses concern that (2018: 179): ‘the idea of identity presented by … 
some interpretations of children’s identity rights (… which highlight genet-
ics and biology), depends on an idea of identity based on an unchanging foun-
dational core of the human person’, which equates a right to identity with 
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 knowledge of genetic or biological origins’. For Marshall (ibid.), this has the 
potential for oppression, in that it ‘can be used to justify the state making peo-
ple feel that they have to bring to fruition and liberate some inner core, to “find 
out” who they “truly” are’. She fears that (2018: 180) ‘[p]erpetuating genetic and 
biological views of what constitutes a child’s identity right pits the child against 
a woman who wishes not to reveal her own identity and/or the identity of the 
father’, and ‘risks making the adopted child, who might otherwise have been 
content, feel he or she is living an inauthentic life, and that his or her right to 
identity is being contravened and damaged in some way’. This (ibid.) ‘could 
also be used, not only to argue for revelation of this information, but to make 
the woman feel her decision to relinquish a child is inauthentic and impermis-
sible’. Marshall (177) places much emphasis on the qualification, ‘as far as pos-
sible’ in the wording of Article 7 on the right to know one’s parents, but that is 
open to interpretation and does not necessarily reduce the extent of protection 
of informational rights. As Fenton-Glynn (2014: 188) puts it, ‘Geraldine Van 
Beuren [(1995)] rightly argues that this phrase should be read as relating to the 
practicality of providing the information, not the legality’.
In Marshall’s (2018: 179) view, however, ‘[i]dentity rights pursuant to the 
crc … can … be interpreted differently’ to the focus on genetic origin, in that 
‘[r]ather than focusing on the past, on needing to know everything about other 
people’s lives, including those of one’s father and birth giver in a unfairly gen-
dered world, and reducing our identity to blood or genes, it is possible to ex-
plore different ways in which we can gain a strong sense of our identity through 
lived existence and belonging from birth’. Her preference for ‘lived existence’ 
may derive some support from Ronen (2004), who argues that the crc does 
not go far enough in allowing children to maintain ties meaningful to them.
Marshall (2018: 178) appears to advocate a ‘more fluid idea of identity focus-
ing on self-determination through lived experience.’ In her view (ibid.: 179), 
‘any human right to identity must be related to care and encourage an environ-
ment of belonging and inclusion for any newborn and birth giver’, which ‘has 
potential to be a more empowering, positive and kinder way to proceed in this 
context of secrecy in pregnancy and birth and to help lead to a more gender-
equal world’. Further (ibid.: 180), ‘[t]he law could, and should, instead enable 
everyone to be safe, well, and enabled to have a private life through the provi-
sion of care and support’, encouraging ‘a sense of belonging for both birth giver 
and children born secretly’. Marshall (2018: 184) considers ‘it … worth reflecting 
as to why [sympathetic] attitudes towards anonymity [for mothers] are so 
sparse in times of peace and beyond the case of rape’. In her view, ‘[f]amily love 
and connection from birth are ongoing activities and experiences through-
out our lives, forming part of the creation of our identity as a project within 
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 relationships’, and ‘[s]afe relinquishment can … safeguard children from infan-
ticide and abuse, abortion, and abandonment on the street’. This is despite the 
fact that Fenton-Glynn (2014: 193) finds ‘no indication that either anonymous 
birth or baby-boxes have had any effect on the number of abortions or children 
illegally abandoned or killed’, although a more nuanced empirical picture may 
have emerged since Fenton-Glynn was writing (see, e.g., Klier et al., 2013).
In contrast to her preference, Marshall (2018: 179) cites ‘a shift in judicial at-
titudes’ towards openness about genetic origins, apparently in England and 
Wales, ‘that risks being exploited and manipulated, for example, by biological 
fathers claiming that they should have a relationship with the child despite the 
opposition of the mother’. It might surely be questioned, however, whether it 
is really ‘manipulation’ when having a relationship with her father would be 
consistent with the child’s welfare and rights, or whether there is not equally a 
risk of ‘manipulation’ where a mother successfully convinces a judge that it 
would be undesirable for a child to have a relationship with the father, poten-
tially because the mother simply wants nothing further to do with him (see, 
e.g., Sloan, 2009).
Ultimately, Marshall (2018: 185) concludes that ‘[a] sense of identity can be 
developed based on the encouragement and support provided to a newborn 
child, infant and young person through love, care and nurturance and building 
a sense of their own identity throughout life, through the development of self-
esteem and self-confidence’. She (2018: 185) asserts that:
Showing care and respect by listening to, and acting upon, a girl’s or 
woman’s choice to relinquish and to keep her pregnancy and birth secret 
can coincide with a child’s best interests and identity rights by assisting 
the child to live in security and to be cared for by those who love, want, 
support, and are capable of looking after the child. Providing social con-
ditions to improve care and belonging for both the child born secretly 
and the secret birth giver can be part of a process to bring about such 
freedom.
There is clearly much of merit in Marshall’s arguments. There is certainly a 
case for suggesting that “identity” rights for the purposes of Article 8 would be 
overly narrowly interpreted if they were said to relate solely to biological or 
genetic origins. The reference to creating the impression of an “inauthentic 
life” for someone not raised by the biological family arguably reflects Robert 
Leckey’s (2015) critique of arguments in favour of greater access to genetic in-
formation for those who are donor-conceived or adopted. On Leckey’s (ibid.: 
527) analysis, such arguments ‘oppose the incomplete, insecure identity of 
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 adopted or donor-conceived individuals to the ostensibly complete, secure 
identity of those raised by their putatively genetic parents’, such that they 
 ‘exaggerate what is distinct, and harmful, about being adopted or donor- 
conceived’. But there is surely a significant risk of social engineering if the state 
uses “lived experience” or “lived existence” to justify the de-emphasis of bio-
logical origins as aspects of identity, particularly since the child will not have 
much in the way of lived experience at the time of relinquishment in the core 
scenario considered in this paper. As for Article 7, Bainham (1999: 38) force-
fully argues that, because of the history and context of the crc, ‘“parents” in 
the Convention was intended to mean genetic parents and … the onus is very 
firmly on those who would argue for an unconventional interpretation’. More-
over, the United Kingdom entered a declaration on ratification of the crc to 
the effect that it interprets the references in the Convention to “parents” to 
mean only those persons who, as a matter of national law, are treated as par-
ents’ (United Nations, 2019). While this declaration could cause difficulty after 
adoption in relation to knowledge or contact with birth parents (Sloan, 2014), 
it surely adds weight to the view that in the core scenario under discussion in 
this paper, “parents” must mean biological parents, who are prima facie the 
 legal parents under English law. Otherwise, a child could be rendered legally 
parentless for the purposes of the crc, and deprived of Article 7 rights, unless 
and until adopted. Similar considerations would also apply to references to 
parents in Article 5, inter alia, albeit that Article 5 clearly encompasses the 
right to receive appropriate direction and guidance from those who are not 
“parents” but otherwise have legal or de facto responsibility for the child, which 
may include prospective adopters on particular facts.
It must be recognised that Marshall is arguing that genetic origins should be 
lessened as an aspect of identity. This is in contrast to what the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child says about anonymous birth, and access to information. 
Marshall (2018: 171) notes, with apparent concern, that ‘there appears to be a 
growing assumption that fathers, and wider family members, ought to know of 
the child’s existence’, noting (177) that the crc Committee has ‘expressed con-
cern at what it describes as the “alarming spread” of the use of baby boxes in 
certain parts of Europe’, citing Ramesh (2012). Such boxes, as Fenton-Glynn 
(2014: 186) puts it, ‘allow parents to leave children in the care of the state anon-
ymously’. They ‘commonly take the form of an incubated crib in a hospital or 
child welfare centre’. When a child is placed by the mother in the crib, ‘a bell is 
rung, and the mother can leave anonymously before a carer comes to take the 
child. After a waiting period ranging from two to eight weeks, depending on 
the jurisdiction, the child is then placed for adoption’. In a Concluding Obser-
vation relating to the Czech Republic, the Committee on the Rights of the 
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Child (2011: [49]-[50]) expressed itself ‘seriously concerned about the State 
party’s so-called “Baby Box” programme, which is in violation of, inter alia, 
 Articles 6, 7, 8, 9 and 19 of the Convention’ and:
…strongly urge[d] the State party to undertake all measures necessary to 
end the “Baby Box” programme as soon as possible and expeditiously 
strengthen and promote alternatives, taking into full account the duty to 
fully comply with all provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, the 
Committee urge[d] the State party to increase its efforts to address the 
root causes which lead to the abandonment of infants, including the pro-
vision of family planning as well as adequate counseling and social sup-
port for unplanned pregnancies and the prevention of risk pregnancies.
Concern has also been expressed by the UN about the exclusion of fathers 
from adoption processes. The Handbook (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007: 296) 
opines that ‘[s]tates should reconsider … laws that do not permit fathers of 
children born outside marriage to have any potential rights in adoption proce-
dures’, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2004: [42]) has referred 
to the need for ‘both legal parents’ to consent to adoption. The UN Guidelines 
on the Alternative Care of Children (UN General Assembly, 2010: [10]), more-
over, provide that ‘[s]pecial efforts should be made to tackle discrimination on 
the basis of any status of the child or parents’, including, inter alia, ‘birth out of 
wedlock’ and ‘all other statuses and circumstances that can give rise to relin-
quishment, abandonment and/or removal of a child’.
As Hodgkin and Newell (2007: 296) put it, the Committee has ‘made clear 
that adopted children have the right to be told they are adopted and to know 
the identity of their biological parents, if they so wish, which implies keeping 
accurate and accessible records of the adoption’. The Committee (2004: [40]) 
has expressed ‘concern at [a] practice of keeping the identity of biological par-
ents of the adoptee secret’. Hodgkin and Newell (2007: 107) assert that ‘chil-
dren’s right to know their parentage could only be refused on the grounds of 
best interests in the most extreme and unambiguous circumstances’, and ad-
vises states to ensure that ‘information about genetic parents is preserved to be 
made available to children if possible’. Their Handbook (ibid.: 108) appears to 
suggest that states should facilitate the collection of information for future dis-
tribution even where the mother faces a risk of ‘extreme forms of social con-
demnation, such as ostracism, injury or death’. This is an extreme proposition 
(Besson, 2008), and while the Handbook is endorsed by the Chairs of the Com-
mittee and aims to synthesise the Committee’s views, it does not cite a specific 
source for its assertion. But even if it is possible to argue that the Handbook 
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states the position too strongly, if genetic/biological aspects are still part of a 
child’s identity to some extent, there should surely be some scrutiny as to the 
reasons why such secrecy is necessary on the particular facts. It should be 
borne in mind that the child did not choose to be born at all, or indeed to be 
relinquished and brought up outside the biological family. The mother, by con-
trast, except in the very difficult case of rape, did choose to engage in an activ-
ity (namely sexual intercourse) that could (even if this was not intended) pro-
duce a child. It is not immediately clear that the mother’s interest in keeping 
that choice secret should automatically prevail over the child’s interest when 
she desires it, even if on particular facts Marshall is correct to say that those 
interests might coincide. There is surely a distinction between saying that a 
mother must raise a child and is not permitted to relinquish him or her (which 
none of the legal systems to be considered in the next section of this paper do), 
and saying that the mother can simply decide that there should be no link 
whatsoever between her (and/or the father) and the child. On Fenton-Glynn’s 
(2014: 190) analysis, ‘anonymous birth and relinquishment allow the mother to 
unilaterally decide the extent to which a child’s rights can be exercised’. While 
there may be a limited justification for this phenomenon within Article 5, as 
she notes it ‘deprives the child and his or her father from establishing any rela-
tionship, denying the father the chance to care for the child if he so wishes’. 
Further (ibid.: 191), ‘[t]he right of a child to be cared for by his or her parents is 
not predicated on the sex of that parent’ (see Sloan, 2019 on Article 2 and dis-
crimination between parents as regards parental responsibility), and ‘there is 
no reason why the mother should be permitted to choose the involvement of 
the father in the child’s life, even if she has been the one who has given birth’.
There is also a paradox in Marshall’s argument: she (quite reasonably to a 
significant degree in the practical sense) denies the obligation of the person 
who has given birth to be a “mother”, but at the same time advocates the right 
of that person to determine conclusively whether the resulting child should 
have any relationship at all with the biological family. In any event, as Fenton-
Glynn (2014: 191) puts it, chiming with what I have argued above, rights ‘to re-
fuse motherhood, and to escape defined societal roles and the moral and legal 
obligations imposed on parents … are not predicated on anonymity, but can be 
achieved simply through placing the child for adoption in a conventional 
manner’.
In my view, Article 5, inter alia, means that a biological father should be 
presumptively entitled, for the benefit of the child, to know that his child exists 
and have some level of involvement in the adoption proceedings. Where it is 
proposed that this should not occur (and Fenton-Glynn (2017) accepts that 
there can be no absolute duty to involve the father even when writing from a 
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children’s rights perspective, agreeing to that extent with Marshall), it should 
be by virtue of a clear judicial finding that, exceptionally, it would be contrary 
to the best interests of the child for the father to be informed or involved, and 
the father should not be excluded based on the mere whim or preference of 
the mother alone. In the language of Article 5, there must be some indepen-
dent evaluation of which parent’s (likely) ‘direction and guidance’ is most ‘ap-
propriate’ or consistent with the child’s best interests. While Article 8 identity-
based rights should not be limited to the biological/genetic manifestations of 
the concept, they should certainly include those elements, and it should be no 
answer to an allegation that Article 8 has been breached that the “identity” of 
a particular child has been artificially adjusted by the state at the behest of the 
mother such that it no longer includes that child’s biological parents. Conven-
tion rights mean that “anonymous” or “secret” births are potentially problem-
atic and should be subject to regulation if permitted. Presumptively, then, the 
biological parents should be the parents for the purposes of Articles 7 and 5 
inter alia. For Marshall’s argument prioritising the choice of mothers to be con-
sidered valid, such that there is no real scrutiny of what constitutes a child’s 
best interests on particular facts, I would suggest that a route would have to be 
found outside the corners of the crc (given its emphasis on child welfare). It 
must be conceded, however, that matters may be more complicated in circum-
stances where the mother herself is a child (meaning under the age of 18 by 
virtue of uncrc, Article 1) at the time she gives birth. The next section of this 
paper measures the legal approaches within the British Isles against these sug-
gested implications of the crc.
3 Substantive Law
3.1 England and Wales
Unlike the situation in France and several other jurisdictions (Marshall, 2018; 
Fenton-Glynn, 2014), the person who gives birth to a child in England and 
Wales is obliged to register the birth within 42 days (Births and Deaths Regis-
tration Act 1953, s. 2). If she is married to the father, that obligation is shared 
with her husband, but if not, the mother has it alone and is not currently 
obliged to provide any information about the father on registration (Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1953, s. 10; cf. Welfare Reform Act 2009, Sch. 6, consid-
ered further below). Despite the obligation to register and be registered in the 
first instance, the mother will nevertheless be able to consent to the placement 
of the child for adoption (Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 19), and to give 
advance consent to the adoption itself (Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 20) 
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by virtue of her automatic parental responsibility (see further Sloan, 2019), 
 albeit that the process cannot be completed without a court order made when 
treating the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration (Adoption and 
Children Act 2002, ss. 1, 46), with that welfare significantly including the effect 
throughout the child’s life of ceasing to be a member of the birth family (Adop-
tion and Children Act 2002, s. 1(4)(c)).
On Marshall’s (2018: 172) analysis, the English case law, ‘indicates that the 
father has no right to know of the child’s existence or, if there is a right, it can 
be lawfully interfered with’. There is, however, an obligation in secondary legis-
lation, ‘where the father of the child does not have parental responsibility for 
the child and the father’s identity is known to the adoption agency’ (Adoption 
Agencies Regulations 2005/389, r. 14(3)), and where the agency ‘is satisfied it is 
appropriate to do so’, to provide counselling, explain to him the legal effect of 
adoption and related processes, ascertain his wishes and feelings on the adop-
tion, and ascertain whether he wishes to apply for parental responsibility and/
or another relevant order (Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005/389, r. 14(4)). 
But it is clear that there is much local authority discretion.
The leading case on involvement of fathers in adoption is now Re A, B and C 
(Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] ewca Civ 41 (see 
 Fenton-Glynn, 2017 and Sloan, 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2018 for discussion of previ-
ous relevant case law, including Re C (A Child) (Adoption: Duty of Local Author-
ity) [2007] ewca Civ. 1206). In Re A, B and C, the Court of Appeal considered 
three separate appeals on the issue and conducted a comprehensive review 
of the law. Somewhat controversially, and not necessarily consistently with 
 Article 21 of the crc, it held that child welfare is not paramount on the ques-
tion whether a father or other relatives should be notified about a child’s ex-
istence or proceedings that could ultimately lead to the child’s adoption. The 
matter was held to be neither a decision ‘relating to the upbringing of a child’ 
for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 or ‘relating to the adop-
tion of a child’ for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002, but rather one about ‘who should be consulted about such a decision’ 
(Re A, B and C, [83]). As such, the correct approach was to balance the interests 
of the various parties involved in a fact-sensitive manner.
In expounding the balancing approach, the Court of Appeal noted that 
where a mother desires confidentiality, her right to respect for private life 
 under the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged and can be 
 infringed only when necessary to protect the rights of others. That said, the 
‘profound importance’ of adoption is clearly capable of overriding the moth-
er’s request ([85]), depending on the circumstances. The Court noted the pit-
falls of the ‘often limited and one-sided nature of the information available’, 
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 emphasising that ‘[t]he confidential relinquishment of a child for adoption is 
an unusual event and the reasons for it must be respectfully scrutinised so that 
the interests of others are protected’ ([85]). In achieving a fair balance on the 
facts, relevant factors would include: parental responsibility, whose possession 
by the father would cause ‘compelling reasons’ to be required before confiden-
tiality could be justified, Article 8 rights, the substance of the relationships be-
tween the protagonists, the likelihood of a family placement, the impact on 
the mother and others of notification, cultural and religious factors, the avail-
ability and durability of the confidential information and the impact of delay. 
Ultimately, ‘maintenance of confidentiality is exceptional’ ([85]).
In each of the three cases before it, the Court of Appeal refused to sanction 
confidentiality. In the A case, the mother and father were students who previ-
ously had a 4½-year relationship. Inter alia, the judge had attached undue 
weight to the alleged impact of disclosure on the mother and her view that the 
father was unlikely to have anything to offer, failing to achieve an appropriate 
balance. His decision was overturned. In B, paternity was uncertain and the 
mother had been abused. But a family placement was possible, the judge had 
appropriately balanced the factors and the local authority should continue its 
enquiries. In the C case, the parents were married with other children but the 
mother alleged that the child concerned had been conceived as a result of rape 
and she was worried about the reaction of the father if he found out about the 
child. Despite the circumstances, confidentiality would be an ‘extremely strong 
course to take’ in light of the father’s parental responsibility automatically con-
ferred by marriage. The parental responsibility meant that the father’s consent 
was prima facie required to any adoption, albeit that it could be dispensed with 
where the child’s welfare ‘require[d]’ it (Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 52). 
Disclosure was held to be appropriate on the facts.
The framework set out in Re A, B and C clearly runs contrary to Marshall’s 
preference and is closer to according with the interpretation of Article 5 put 
forward in the last section of this paper. It remains the case, however, that on 
particular facts a mother may still be given an effective veto. It is highly sig-
nificant, for example, that the Court of Appeal regarded Re C (A Child) (Adop-
tion: Duty of Local Authority) [2007] ewca Civ. 1206) as ‘plainly correctly de-
cided’ (Re A, B and C, [5]). Re C involved a mother who had become pregnant 
after a one-off sexual encounter, and who made it clear that she wished the 
resulting child to be adopted shortly after birth. She kept the pregnancy se-
cret from her own parents and the biological father, who did not have parental 
responsibility, and refused to identify him. The local authority charged with 
the child’s care and eventual adoption sought judicial guidance on whether 
it should attempt  to identity the father (it being likely that it could do so if 
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independent enquiries were made), inform him of the child’s birth and pos-
sible adoption and assess him as a potential carer even though he did not have 
parental responsibility. The Court of Appeal ordered the local authority not 
to take any steps to identify the father. The priority was held to be finding a 
permanent home for the child, who was four months old by the time of the 
hearing, without any further delay. This, on the court’s analysis, was the course 
of action most compatible with the child’s best interests, and there was no 
evidence that the father could care for her based on what the mother had told 
the court. But the precise nature of the parents’ relationship is not given de-
tailed consideration in the Court of Appeal’s judgments, which is problem-
atic. This may simply have been a case where the mother, irrespective of the 
child’s interests, did not disclose the resulting pregnancy to the father simply 
because she wanted nothing further to do with him, although it does reflect 
Marshall’s preference. In A, B and C, however, the Court of Appeal described 
Re C as:
…a strong case on its facts, there being no reason to doubt the mother’s 
account that her relationship with the father had been a fleeting one, 
with the consequence that her wish for privacy was always likely to pre-
vail ([66]).
I would respectfully, suggest, however, that it is not necessarily clear that Re C 
is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s own approach in the later case of Re A, 
B and C, and particularly its concern about the potentially one-sided nature of 
the information provided by the mother.
The focus on the relationship between the parents is also shown by the sig-
nificance of the presence or absence of parental responsibility, and its impact 
on consent. This, in turn, is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s conclusion in the 
C element of the Re A, B and C decision. Since most fathers not married to the 
mother of their children obtain parental responsibility (usually through regis-
tration on the child’s birth certificate (Children Act 1989, s. 4(1)(a); only 5.2 per 
cent of births were registered by the mother alone in 2016 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017: 8)), it would be an exaggeration to say that English law excludes 
unmarried fathers from a prima facie requirement to consent to adoption as a 
rule. But the key point is that parental responsibility for an unmarried father 
requires either co-operation from the mother or a court order. In this paper’s 
core scenario, the mother is actively trying to prevent the father from having 
any involvement in the child’s life, and if a father does not even know about the 
child’s existence, he is hardly likely to seek a court order that he does not re-
alise he needs.
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Schedule 6 to the Welfare Reform Act 2009 could in principle have ame-
liorated this effect. Somewhat consistently with several other jurisdictions 
(Sloan, 2017) it would have obliged mothers not married to the fathers of 
their children to register those fathers as such, except in ostensibly limited, 
albeit arguably exploitable, circumstances (Department for Children, Schools 
& Families 2010). But it seems that it will not be brought into effect (Clifton, 
2014). It is arguable that, even following Re A, B and C, the law should attach 
greater importance to the child’s likely de facto relationship with the father, 
rather than (at times formalistically) the relationship between the parents 
per se.
In an overall sense, English law rhetorically complies with the requirements 
of Article 5 by presumptively at least involving fathers irrespective of parental 
responsibility and excluding them only in “exceptional” circumstances, even if 
it is ultimately possible to order adoption against the wishes of fathers. It re-
mains to be seen, however, whether this “exceptionality” will always be truly 
present even in light of Re A, B and C. There may still be scope (inter alia be-
cause of the unsatisfactory law on parental responsibility allocation) for judges 
simply to act according to the personal preference of the mother in excluding 
the father, largely in a manner advocated by Marshall but in my view unfavour-
able in the light of the requirements of the crc.
3.2 Scotland
It is claimed that the adoption of children looked after by the state in Scotland 
‘does not happen very often’ (Kidner, 2012:10), and the policy context of adop-
tion in England and Scotland may therefore differ (Sloan, 2016). There are also 
apparently fewer reported cases on the subject of this paper. The basic struc-
ture of Scots law’s response to this paper’s core scenario, however, is essentially 
the same as in England, including on birth registration (Registration of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965; cf. Scottish Government 2018, 
Part  12) and the paramountcy of welfare (Adoption and Children (Scotland) 
2007, s. 14).
In Scotland, a “parent” whose consent is prima facie required for a child’s 
adoption means a parent who ‘has any parental responsibilities or parental 
rights in relation to the child’ or does not have them ‘by virtue of a permanence 
order which does not include provision granting authority for the child to be 
adopted’ (Adoption and Children (Scotland) 2007, s. 31(15)). As in England, the 
consent of even such a father can still be dispensed with on the basis that child’s 
welfare ‘requires’ it (Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s. 31(3)(d) 
of the 2007 Act, even if the grounds for dispensing with consent ‘are speci-
fied in greater detail than in sec 52(1) of the [English] 2002 Act’ (S v. L [2012] 
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uksc 30, [25]). The ‘welfare requires’ provision in section 31(3)(d) of the 2007 
Act applies only where the parent has parental responsibilities or rights or is 
likely to be given them in the future (Adoption and Children (Scotland) 2007, 
s. 31(5)), and it cannot be said that the parent is ‘unable satisfactorily’ to dis-
charge or exercise those rights or responsibilities and ‘is likely to continue to be 
unable to do so’ (Adoption and Children (Scotland) 2007, s. 31(4)). It has thus 
been described as ‘a residual ground’ (S [2014] csih 42, [28]). Section 31(3)(d) 
is narrower in scope in the context than the equivalent ground in the English 
2002 Act. While it directs a court to consider the extent to which a parent can 
look after a child effectively (now or in the future) before dispensing with con-
sent, it also underlines the fact that consent can in principle be dispensed with 
even where no such finding can be made (see further Sloan, 2016).
While the father will have parental rights and responsibilities where he is 
‘married to the mother at the time of the child’s conception or subsequently’ 
(Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 3), if he is unmarried he will have such rights 
and responsibilities if he has been registered as the father on the child’s birth 
certificate (from May 2006 under s. 3) (including re-registration, unlike in 
England and Wales), by registered agreement with the mother (Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, s. 4) or by court order (Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11). 
Importantly, as Norrie (2013: [6.09]) describes and as reflects the current situ-
ation in England and Wales, ‘[t]he father must have the co-operation of the 
mother to be registered [on the birth certificate], and so, in the absence of any 
court decree, the mother is the “gatekeeper” to the father’s entitlement to pa-
rental responsibilities and parental rights’, albeit that (again broadly consis-
tently with England and Wales), only 4.3 per cent of birth registrations in 2016 
were sole ones (National Records of Scotland, 2017). The obligations of an 
adoption agency under secondary legislation towards a father without paren-
tal rights and responsibilities are also notably similar to those in England 
(Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154, r. 14). Scots law there-
fore raises similar issues to English law in relation to the scenario under dis-
cussion for the purposes of crc compatibility, however much relevant case 
law is lacking.
3.3 Ireland
Adoption has had a controversial history in Ireland, involving extreme secre-
cy  (cf. now Adoption (Information and Tracing) Bill 2016, not yet passed at 
the  time of writing) and stigmatised unmarried mothers cruelly treated in 
mother and baby homes and essentially forced to agree to the child’s adop-
tion   (McCaughren and Lovett, 2014). Conversely, married parents were un-
able voluntarily to have their child placed for adoption until a change to the 
Downloaded from Brill.com12/03/2020 03:01:04PM




international journal of children’s rights 28 (2020) 666-688
 Constitution (Irish Constitution, article 42A.3) and the implementation of the 
 Adoption (Amendment) Act 2017 (see further Sloan, 2018a). It must be noted at 
the outset that an adoption order may be made by the quasi-judicial Adoption 
Authority rather than a court in Ireland, but it will be seen that courts do have 
a role to play in the scenario with which this paper is concerned. The welfare 
of  the child is now the ’paramount’ consideration (Adoption (Amendment) 
Act 2017, s. 9), rather than the ‘first and paramount’ one (Adoption Act 2010, 
s.  19  (pre-amendment)), consistently with both England and Scotland and 
 Article 21 of the crc.
In its Concluding Observations on Ireland’s initial report, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (1998: [17]) was concerned ‘about the disadvantaged 
situation of children born of unmarried parents due to the lack of appropriate 
procedures to name the father in the birth registration of the child’, which ‘also 
has an adverse impact on the implementation of other rights in relation to 
adoption which, under current regulations, can take place without the consent 
of the father’. Whatever the general obligations placed on parents in relation to 
birth registration (Civil Registration Act 2004, s. 19), it remains true that infor-
mation about the unmarried father is not required to be registered (Civil Reg-
istration Act 2004, s. 22). While reforms were enacted to require information 
about the father to be recorded except in limited circumstances (Civil Registra-
tion (Amendment) Act 2014), these have yet to be commenced and do not 
grant substantive rights in relation to adoption in any event.
As regards adoption specifically, the basic position (subject to the ability to 
dispense with consent) is now that an adoption order cannot be made ‘with-
out the consent of every person, being the child’s mother or guardian or other 
person having charge of or control over the child’ (Adoption Act 2010, s. 26). 
This may exclude a father who is not a guardian, albeit that the relevant Au-
thority is under a basic duty to ‘take such steps as are reasonably practicable to 
ensure that every relevant non-guardian of the child is consulted in relation to 
the adoption’, except in limited circumstances (Adoption Act 2010, s. 30). One 
such circumstance is where the adoption authority is satisfied that, ‘having 
regard to’ ‘the nature of the relationship between the relevant non-guardian of 
a child and the mother or guardian of the child’, or ‘the circumstances of the 
conception of the child’, ‘it would be inappropriate for the Authority to consult 
the relevant non-guardian in respect of the adoption of that child’ (Adoption 
Act 2010, s. 30(3)). There, with court approval, the adoption can proceed with-
out consultation with that non-guardian. A ‘relevant non-guardian’ includes a 
father who is not a guardian (Adoption Act 2010, s. 3), and a father (in turn) 
includes a person who ‘believes himself to be the father of the child’ (Adop-
tion Act 2010, s. 30(1)). Where the father ‘is unknown to the Authority and the 
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mother or guardian of the child will not or is unable to disclose the identity of 
that father’, the Authority is obliged to ‘counsel the mother or guardian of the 
child, indicating’ ‘that the adoption may be delayed’, ‘the possibility of that fa-
ther of the child contesting the adoption at some later date’, ‘that the absence 
of information about the medical, genetic and social background of the child 
may be detrimental to the health, development or welfare of the child’, and 
‘such other matters as the Authority considers appropriate in the circumstanc-
es’ (Adoption Act 2010, s. 30(4)). After it has done so, the Authority ‘may, after 
first obtaining the approval of the High Court, make the adoption order with-
out consulting [the] father’ if ‘the mother or guardian of the child either re-
fuses to reveal the identity of that father of the child, or provides the Authority 
with a statutory declaration that he or she is unable to identify that father’, and 
‘the Authority has no other practical means of ascertaining the identity of that 
father’ (Adoption Act 2010, s. 30(5)).
It can be seen that, for reasons of practicality, the mother retains much con-
trol over the process, and much will depend on the exercise of a value judg-
ment by the adoption authority and the court. A possible advantage of the 
Irish position for the purposes of Article 5, however, is that the circumstanc-
es  in which a father need not be consulted (alongside what is to be done 
where the mother will not cooperate) are fairly clearly set out in primary legis-
lation,  rather than being the subject of an open-ended assessment and/or 
weak obligations in secondary legislation. The ‘counselling’ obligation im-
posed on the Adoption Authority displays an admirable understanding of the 
notion of identity and other matters as understood by the Convention and 
the Committee.
It should nevertheless be noted that the consent to the adoption of a(n un-
married) father who is not a ‘guardian or other person having charge of or con-
trol over the child’ is still not required in the first place (Adoption Act 2010, s. 
26(1)), albeit that fathers are more likely to have guardianship by virtue of the 
reforms introduced by the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 (Guard-
ianship of Infants Act 1964, s. 2(4A)). As in both England and Scotland, unmar-
ried fathers do not, as a category, automatically acquire “guardianship” (equiv-
alent to parental responsibility or parental responsibilities and rights) for their 
children. Unlike in those jurisdictions, however, even an unmarried father can 
in some circumstances obtain guardianship without either the mother’s agree-
ment or a court order (see further Sloan, 2019). At first glance, this is encourag-
ing for the purposes of Article 5 etc., albeit that it is still predicated on a rela-
tively substantial relationship between the parents that may not be present 
in  this paper’s core scenario. The final Children and Family Relationships 
Act’s formulation is that an unmarried father will be a guardian if he ‘and the 
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mother of the child concerned have been cohabitants for not less than 12 
 consecutive months occurring after the date on which [the relevant] subsec-
tion comes into operation, which shall include a period, occurring at any time 
after the birth of the child, of not less than three consecutive months during 
which both the mother and the [father] have lived with the child’ (Guardian-
ship of Infants Act 1964, s. 2(4A)), and it is expressly provided that ‘“cohabitant” 
shall be construed in accordance with’ the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights 
and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Children and Family Relationships 
Act 2015, s. 2). The new provision is clearly an improvement on the previous 
law (similar to that in England and Scotland), though it still places much con-
trol for the automatic granting of guardianship in the hands of the mother 
(Treoir, 2014: [2.1.1]).
Under the 2010 Act as amended in 2017, the consent prima facie required of 
a relevant parent can be dispensed with (with court approval) where, inter alia, 
parents have failed in their duty towards the child for 36 months ‘to such extent 
that the safety or welfare of the child is likely to be prejudicially affected’, that 
there must be ‘no reasonable prospect that the parents will be able to care for 
the child in a manner that will not prejudicially affect his or her safety or wel-
fare’, and that the child must have been in the ‘custody’ of the applicants for at 
least 18 months (Adoption (Amendment) Act 2017, s. 24). There is a new require-
ment (alongside the pre-existing one that ‘by reason of the failure, the State, as 
guardian of the common good, should supply the place of the parents’) that ‘the 
adoption of the child by the applicants is a proportionate means by which to 
supply the place of the parents’ (Adoption (Amendment) Act 2017, s. 24).
Overall, despite (or perhaps because of) its difficult history with adoption, 
in many ways Ireland takes an approach that is likely to be consistent with the 
interpretation of the crc put forward in this paper. Conversely, Irish Law is not 
fully consistent with the approach advocated by Marshall.
4 Conclusion
There are, of course, legitimate debates to be had about whether children’s 
rights and welfare should be prioritised to the extent that appears to be under-
taken by the crc. It is also arguable that the stance taken by this paper risks 
simply furthering the interests of one parent (the father) over another (the 
mother) in the adoption process, which is not necessarily any more conducive 
to furthering the interests of the child. But within the confines of the crc, it is 
doubtful whether the secrecy advocated by Marshall on adoption can be 
 justified. The jurisdictions under scrutiny in this paper offer a preferable ap-
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proach. It must be emphasised that, even where a father is involved in the 
adoption process and objects to adoption, it remains perfectly possible to dis-
pense with his consent, essentially on the basis of child welfare, in England, 
Scotland and Ireland. Moreover, there is still value in involving fathers from an 
informational perspective even if they prove unsuitable to care for or even 
have a relationship with the child: while this was rejected in the English case of 
Re C (still regarded as correctly decided in Re A, B and C), Fenton-Glynn (2017) 
has criticised the Court of Appeal for the purposes of the crc for taking an 
unduly narrow view of welfare there. From an Article 5 perspective, it seems 
preferable that neither fathers nor mothers should have essentially uncontest-
ed authority either to cause or prevent an adoption, even if this paper has had 
to concede that Article 5 has less to say on adoption than other provisions of 
the Convention.
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